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Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
In Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. (IBM),'
the district court for the Northern District of Oklahoma held 2 that
IBM violated § 2 of the Sherman Act.3 In its decision, the court con-
fronted the unresolved issue of what pricing actions a lawfully acquired
monopoly4 may take under § 2. This Note analyzes the Telex contribu-
tion to the monopoly pricing issue.5
1. 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (amended judgment and decree), appeal docketed,
Nos. 73-1874 to 1878, 1961, 1962, 10th Cir., Nov. 30, 1973.
IBM has remained the giant of the computer industry (defined as general purpose
digital computers and peripheral equipment, see note 63 infra) throughout the industry's
20-year existence, despite competition from other manufacturers of computer systems
(now seven in number), computer leasing companies, and peripherals manufacturers such
as Telex. See generally G. Brock, The United States Computer Industry 1954-1973, May
1973, at 27-82 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univ.). The pattern of competi-
tion in the industry is entry by a new rival, pricing or product response by IBM, and
antitrust litigation by the competitor. See id. at 185-284, 323-63. Telex is IBM's first defeat
on the merits in the mass of antitrust litigation challenging its dominant position in the
computer industry. Although Control Data Corporaton, a systems manufacturer, settled
its suit out of court in 1973, IBM faces pending actions by leasing companies. Greyhound
Computer Corp. is appealing to the Ninth Circuit a 1972 directed verdict for IBM,
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 92,953 (D. Ariz.). And pe-
ripherals manufacturers are suing IBM. Five companies have filed suits in the wake of
the Telex decision, THINK, July-Aug. 1974, at 5 (editorial introduction). The Justice
Department suit, filed in January, 1969, is set for trial early in 1975. Id.
2. 367 F. Supp. at 341, 345. The court awarded Telex injunctive relief and treble
damages of .$260 million. The court held for IBM on Telex's claims under § 1 of the
Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act, id. at 346-47, and awarded IBM $22 million on
its counterclaim for theft of trade secrets and copyright infringement. Id. at 358, 362.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor ....
4. The legal and economic analysis of this Note applies not only to monopoly firms
and to oligopoly firms acting as joint monopolists, see note 18 infra, but also to the
broader class of dominant firms, defined as those that possess more than 50 percent of
the market and face a competitive fringe of small firms. F. SCHERER, INDUSTMIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 165 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER]. Absent
a conspiracy, a dominant firm that does not possess monopoly power can only be liable
under § 2 for attempt to monopolize. Attempt requires specific intent to monopolize but
monopolization does not. See notes 39, 90 infra. If the pricing actions of a firm with
monopoly power do not violate § 2, the same actions by a firm without monopoly power
are not a violation. Therefore, the conclusions of this Note with respect to monopoly
pricing apply a fortiori to the dominant firm case.
5. This Note does not consider price discrimination by a monopoly between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. Such price discrimination may
violate the Robinson-Patman Act if its effect "may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion," 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). A monopoly which discriminates in price between pur-
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Part I provides the economic and legal framework for the analysis of
monopoly pricing. Economic theory suggests three basic models of mo-
nopoly pricing behavior. However, the legality of the three types of
monopoly pricing is unclear under existing case law. Part II applies
this framework to Telex. Of the three economic models, limit pricing
best describes IBM's behavior, and the decision must be read as a
holding against limit pricing under § 2. Part III argues that the Telex
rule against limit pricing is bad economics and bad law. To prohibit
limit pricing by a monopoly impairs the efficient allocation of re-
sources and, given the monopoly's advantages over competitors, de-
prives consumers of the lowest prices attainable in the market. More-
over, Telex is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approval of limit
pricing under § 7 of the Clayton Act.0 Accordingly, the Telex holding
that IBM's pricing actions violated § 2 of the Sherman Act should be
reversed.
I. Economic Models and Legal Standards for Monopoly Pricing
In a purely competitive market composed of many small sellers, each
individual firm takes the prevailing market price as a given which it
cannot perceptibly influence.7 At the other extreme, a pure monopoly
supplies 100 percent of the market and, by restricting its output, can
control price in the short run without concern for competitors." Be-
chasers may also violate § 2 of the Sherman Act whether or not a Robinson-Patman
violation is established. United States v. Standard Oil (N.J.), 221 U.S. 1, 32, 43 (1911);
United States v. New York Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1949);
Power Replacements v. Air Preheater Co., 356 F. Supp. 872, 886-90, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(also a Robinson-Patman violation); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244,
256 (D.R.I. 1964), affd, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
The legal definition of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act-charging
different prices to different purchasers of the same commodity-is not the same as the
economic definition-price differentials not directly related to costs of supply. SCHERER,
supra note 4, at 253-72, 495-505. Price discrimination in the economic but not legal sense
would occur if multiproduct firms realize different price-cost margins on items due to
differences in demand conditions. Id. at 257. This Note does discuss such differential
price-cost margins. See pp. 563, 569 infra.
6. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, where the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125.
Other commentators have called attention to the Supreme Court's use of limit pricing
theory in its potential competition decisions tinder § 7. See note 107 infra. This Note
attempts to show the usefulness of limit pricing theory under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
7. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 9-10.
8. Id. at 13-14. The short run is defined as the length of time during which the firm's
plant and equipment are fixed. E. MANSFIELD, N[ICROECONOMICS 117 (1970). Thus entry of
potential competitors or expansion of existing competitors cannot occur in the short run.
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tween these extremes lies a spectrum of market power exhibited by
firms in real world markets.9 At some point toward the pure monopoly
end of the spectrum, the market power of the firm reaches the level
which the courts conclude is monopoly power.' 0 The legal concept of
monopoly is thus not restricted to the pure case of a firm with 100
percent of the market, but may include a dominant firm facing a fringe
of smaller competitors."
The market power of the firm in the long run depends on the extent
of the barriers to the entry or expansion of competitors. These bar-
riers are the technological and institutional advantages of the estab-
lished firm which enable it to raise its price persistently above its
minimal average cost without attracting new entry or expansion.1
2
Examples of such barriers include superior production techniques, ac-
cess to limited supplies of raw materials, or economies of scale. Signif-
icant barriers to entry are a necessary condition for the existence of
monopoly power;" without them, a firm cannot control prices in the
long run no matter how great its current market share, because poten-
tial competitors will enter and bid down the price.
Economic theory provides three models of pricing strategy for the
profit-maximizing' 4 monopoly firm: umbrella, limit and "credible
threat" pricing.
9. Handler, Some Unresolved Issues of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 930, 932-33 (1962).
10. A firm has monopoly power in the relevant market if it has the power to control
prices or exclude competition. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
391 (1956). Monopoly power will ordinarily be inferred from a predominant (80 percent)
share of the market. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (five motion
picture producers, treated as one firm because of conspiracy, with 70 percent share);
Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444
(1952).
12. For the classic theoretical and empirical work on entry barriers, see J. BAIN,
BARRIERS TO NEw COMPETITION (1956). Bain classified barriers in three categories-econ-
omies of scale, absolute cost advantages, and product differentiation-and estimated
their over-all height in twenty manufacturing industries. For a discussion of the use of
barriers in antitrust law, see Disner, Barrier Analysis in Antitrust Law, 58 CORNELL L.
REv. 862 (1972).
13. See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 10; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLIcY 77, 101
(1959). Although the most important criterion in determining monopoly power is the
defendant's market share, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966), courts
have implicitly recognized that long periods of dominant market share almost always
reflect substantial entry barriers. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 798 (1946) (advertising and capital requirements); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945) (tariff and transportation barriers to
foreign producers); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 340-42
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Pullman Co., 50
F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943), aHf'd per curiam, 330 U.S. 806 (1947).
14. This Note does not consider the pricing implications of other assumptions about
firm objectives-for example, that managers seek to maximize sales rather than profits.
See generally SCHERER, supra note 4, at 27-36, 234-36.
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A. Three Economic Models of Monopoly Pricing
1. Umbrella Pricing. The simplest view of monopoly pricing is that
the firm maximizes profits in the short run, producing at an output
which equates its marginal cost and marginal revenue.15 New firms
enter the market, or existing firms expand, under the "umbrella" of
high prices. The monopoly firm then adjusts its price to maximize
again its short-run profits, taking into account the quantity which
existing competitors will supply at a given price but ignoring the
possibility of additional entry or expansion.' 6 Entry and expansion
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The umbrella pricing model is illustrated in Figure 1, a diagram adapted from id. at
164-66. Assume (1) that the marginal cost MC is constant, and hence equal to the average
cost AC, and (2) that the monopoly initially has 100 percent of the market, and hence
faces the industry demand curve DKD. It chooses an output Qu which equates marginal
revenue MR with MC. The resulting umbrella price U attracts a new entrant whose
supply curve is LS. The monopoly now faces a more elastic demand curve D'KD, ob-
tained by subtracting the new entrant's supply curve from the industry demand curve;
below K the new entrant cannot produce and the monopoly faces the original industry
demand curve. The monopoly now equates its new marginal revenue curve MR' with
MC and sets the price U', which is below U but still far above its costs. The price U'
induces further entry, generating a new supply curve and a still more elastic demand
curve, which in turn results in a further drop in price to U".
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will continue to erode the monopoly's market share and force it to
reduce prices until no competitor can enter or expand at the prevailing
market price.
2. Limit Pricing. Limit pricing models" assume that the monop-
olist '8 recognizes in advance the threat posed by potential competitors.
Instead of maximizing short-run profits, the firm sets its price just
below the "limit price"-the price below which no potential competitor
can enter the market and no existing competitor can expand.,' The
limit pricing firm seeks to maximize profits in the long run by fore-
going some short-run profits, deterring entry, and preserving market
share.
Whether limit pricing does in fact maximize the monopoly firm's
long-run profits depends on the level of the limit price relative to both
the umbrella price and the firm's minimum average cost. If the limit
price is calculated to be above the umbrella price, the firm can simply
maximize short-run profits unconstrained by potential competitors.
Where the limit price is below the umbrella price, the firm must com-
pare the temporary profits it foregoes with the discounted value of
long-run profits at the limit price. As the limit price approaches the
firm's average cost, limit pricing becomes less profitable; at some point,
it will not return sufficient long-run profits to outweigh the initially
higher profits from short-run maximization. In this situation the firm
will do better by umbrella pricing even though its market share is
eroded by new entrants.
The level of the limit price is determined by the height of barriers
to entry or expansion. If there are no barriers, the limit price will be
equal to the minimum average cost of the firm in the market, which
will attract new entrants whenever it seeks to raise prices above that
minimum. But since barriers to entry are a necessary condition for the
existence of monopoly power,20 a monopoly firm is likely to be pro-
tected by barriers sufficiently substantial to raise the limit price above
17. For the seminal work on limit pricing, see Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly
and Oligopoly, 39 Ams. EcoN. REV. 448 (1949). See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 219-36 & n.28.
18. Limit pricing may also occur with oligopolists acting as joint monopolists. An
oligopolistic market is one in which a few sellers have a large share of the market. See
SCHERER, supra note 4, at 10. The limit pricing hypothesis was originally offered to
reconcile the theoretical proposition that oligopoly firms collude to maximize their joint
profits, with empirical evidence demonstrating that prices in oligopolistic markets were
persistently below short-run profit-maximizing levels. Bain, supra note 17, at 448-49.
19. See Figure 1, supra note 16. The limit price was originally defined in the context
of a collusive oligopoly seeking to deter the entry of new firms, Bain, supra note 17, at
454, and then generalized in the single-firm monopoly case to include the possibility of
expansion by a fringe of existing competitors. See note 24 infra. From the point of view
of the monopoly firm whose market share is being reduced, the entry of new rivals and
the expansion of existing rivals are analytically equivalent. See J. BAIN, supra note 12,
at 5.
20. See note 13 supra.
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the level at which the firm would prefer an umbrella to a limit pricing
strategy.2' At the same time, empirical evidence indicates that barriers
are almost never so high that the limit price would be above the um-
brella price.22
Different markets will have entry barriers of different types and
magnitudes, which result in different gaps between the limit price
and minimum average cost. The limit pricing monopoly will therefore
have different price-cost margins in each market; it may even engage
in limit pricing in some and umbrella pricing in others. If entry
conditions differ as to separate product lines within a single market,
the firm's price-cost margins will reflect the different limit prices
within the market.
Limit pricing theory has been refined since the early model which
assumed that the firm had to choose between taking all its short-run
profits or excluding all its potential competitors. Modem theory allows
the monopoly firm to follow a flexible strategy, balancing its current
profits against future market share. Under this dynamic model, the
rate of entry depends on the size of the gap between the actual market
price and the absolute limit price which deters all entry.2 3 The firm
will gradually narrow the gap to retard the rate at which its market
share is eroded until the entry and expansion of new competitors are
absolutely forestalled at some equilibrium market share.24
21. The empirical evidence cited in note 30 infra indicates that firms with market
power due to entry barriers often engage in limit pricing. Monopoly firms have the
highest entry barriers and therefore are the most likely to engage in limit pricing.
22. Bain defines the case of limit price greater than umbrella price as "blockaded"
entry, J. BAIN, supra note 12, at 22. J.T. Wenders has shown that even in markets where
Bain found "very high" barriers (limit price 10 percent above minimal average cost), a
limit price above the short-run profit-maximizing price would be unrealistic. Given Bain's
barrier estimates, the likelihood of blockaded entry is very slim. Wenders, Entry and
Monopoly Pricing, 75 J. POL. EcoN. 755 (1967). Government restrictions may, however,
blockade entry, as in the case of state regulations which prohibit branch banking. United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856, 2875-79 (1974).
23. Two factors support this hypothesis. (I) Some potential competitors can enter at
lower prices than others, and hence their exclusion requires a correspondingly greater
sacrifice of the monopoly's short-run profits. The monopoly is likely to allow the entry
of these potential competitors who are very expensive to exclude. (2) Information is im-
perfect and forecasts uncertain about post-entry profits and prices. A small gap between
the market price and the absolute limit price will therefore attract only the least risk-
averse and most efficient potential competitors. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 224.
24. Gaskins used dynamic optimization techniques to formulate the model mathemati-
cally. Gaskins, Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of Entry, 3 J.
EcoN. TUEORY 306 (1971). The monopoly firm is assumed to maximize the present value
of profits over an infinite planning horizon, subject to the erosion of market share
over time (dx/dt, where x(t) = level of rivals' shares). This erosion is given by a dif-
ferential equation of the form
dx:
-k (p (t ) ,dt
where k is a coefficient measuring the speed of response by potential entrants and p is
the limit price at which entry is absolutely forestalled. Gaskins showed that the market
price p(t) will decline to the equilibrium value p at which entry is precluded. Id. at 310.
A similar mathematical specification was developed earlier by Pashigan, Limit Price
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3. Credible Threat Pricing. The third type of monopoly pricing
behavior combines elements of the other two models to give the mo-
nopolist the best of both worlds. The established firm maximizes
short-run profits but at the same time threatens to cut price below the
limit price if entry occurs. Potential competitors are deterred by the
realization that the price umbrella would be closed if they entered. In
effect, the monopoly creates a psychological barrier to entry through
threats of retaliatory price-cutting, which allows it to preserve its
market share without sacrificing any profits.
The price-cutting threat must be credible to deter entry.25 The
monopoly firm must maintain sufficient excess capacity to expand
output suddenly and reduce price sharply if entry occurs.26 The firm
must also develop a reputation for retaliating against new entrants. It
may have to "teach a lesson" to the first new entrant in order to
persuade others not to enterY Establishing a credible price-cutting
and the Market Share of the Leading Firm, 16 J. INDus. ECON. 165 (1968), to determine
the point in time at which the firm switches abruptly from the short-run maximizing
price to the absolute entry-deterring limit price. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 224 n.42. This
model generates results similar to Gaskins' more general formulation which allows for
continuous adjustments in price.
25. Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. LAW & EcoN. 259 (1966),
was the first to present a formal analysis of predatory pricing as a credible threat directed
at potential entrants. He argued that the credibility of the threat depended on the
ability of the firm to sustain losses longer than its rivals and hence required a "long
purse." Id. at 263-69.
26. For an explicit model based on the hypothesis that a monopoly or oligopoly will
carry excess capacity to deter entry, see M. Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and
Oligopolistic Pricing, Apr. 1974 (Tech. Rep. No. 131, Inst. for Math. Stud. in the Soc. Sci.,
Stanford Univ.).
27. Price-cutting by a monopoly below its own costs to drive out a rival is commonly
termed "predatory pricing." Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.
LAw & ECON. 129 (1972). The credible threat model broadens the economic analysis of
predatory pricing from the classic situation of pricing below the firm's own cost to in-
clude price-cutting below a competitor's costs. The two situations involve the same
principle: The monopoly sacrifices profits temporarily to drive out a new rival and then
restores the monopoly price. Yamey, supra, at 132-37. The difference between the two
cases is that "below own cost" pricing is unambiguous evidence of predatory intent since
the price cuts can only be temporary, while "below rival's cost" pricing may be a perma-
nent reduction to a limit price. The judgment of whether price cuts are part of a pred-
atory "credible threat" strategy or a limit pricing strategy depends on whether the cuts
are interpreted as "permanent" or "temporary."
This Note uses the term "credible threat" rather than the traditional "predatory" label
for two reasons. First, it avoids confusion with the use of the term "predatory" in the
case law to mean evidence of a specific intent to monopolize, see note 59 infra. Second,
it emphasizes the importance of the "lesson-teaching" element in temporary price-cutting.
Recognition that the costs incurred in driving out one rival generate benefits in deterring
others is one factor which has led to a questioning of the view once widely held by econ-
omists that predatory pricing is generally an unprofitable, and hence unlikely, strategy
for a monopoly to follow. Compare Yamey, supra, at 130-31 and Posner, Exclusionary
Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 506, 516-17 (1974) with McGhee,
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAw & EcoN. 137, 143, 168
(1958).
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threat is difficult in markets where demand is growing28 or barriers to
entry are low.2 9
The behavioral assumption of each model may be criticized on
theoretical grounds.30 The umbrella pricing model seems unrealistic
because it assumes that the monopoly firm ignores the threat of poten-
tial competitors even after their entry has eroded its market share; the
firm continues its one-period maximization without learning from
experience. The limit pricing model assumes that potential com-
petitors view the existing market price as an accurate predictor of the
post-entry price.31 But potential entrants may ignore the market price
in making the entry decision because they fear a post-entry price-cutting
response by the monopoly firm, because they view the pre-entry price
as a bluff, or because they place greater emphasis on other factors, such
as the rate of growth of demand.3 2 If potential entrants do ignore the
28. The monopoly must correctly forecast a growing demand in order to maintain
excess capacity; it faces a difficult choice between overinvesting in surplus facilities or
risking a capacity constraint. See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 229. A rapid growth of demand
also increases the attractiveness of entry to potential competitors. See G. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 227, 344 (3d ed. 1966).
29. If entry is easy, potential competitors will be strongly tempted to enter, or re-
enter, whenever the monopoly reinstates its umbrella price. Predatory pricing will be
unattractive to the monopolist unless entry barriers are substantial. SCHERER, supra note
4, at 275-76. See Telser, supra note 25. But see Yamey, supra note 27, at 142.
30. The ultimate test of any theory, however plausible, is whether it is substantiated
by the empirical evidence. The limit pricing hypothesis is supported by statistical analyses
of entry and price data and by industry case studies.
SCHERER, supra note 4, at 232, cites the inelastic demand estimates found in concentrated
industries as evidence of limit pricing. If demand is inelastic, a price increase will result
in a smaller percentage decrease in output, thus adding to total revenue. Therefore, mo-
nopoly firms maximizing short-run profits will raise price above the level where demand
is inelastic. Further statistical support is provided by the most recent empirical study of
markets experiencing entry, which concluded that dynamic limit pricing is a possible
explanation of observed entry data. N1. Harris, Entry, Barriers to Entry, and Limit Pricing,
1973 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Univ.).
Industry case studies have also produced evidence of linit pricing, notably by Xerox
in the copying machine market. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 225, 232-33. Scherer also points
out that some entry in industries with high barriers, cited by critics as evidence that limit
pricing is not a common strategy, is consistent with dynamic limit pricing theory. Id. at
224. Highly relevant to the market involved in this Note are the results obtained by G.
Brock, supra note 1, at 152-83, who fitted a dynamic limit pricing model to the computer
systems market and found that the model "quite accurately" represented IBM's pricing,
profits and market shares from 1956 to 1972.
31. In the special case where the barrier to entry is economies of scale, the limit pric-
ing model postulates that potential competitors assume the established firm will hold its
output constant in the face of large scale entry and that the market price will fall because
of the addition of new output to that of the established firm. This postulate of output
maintenance has also been criticized as unrealistic. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 225-29.
32. Many of the objections to limit pricing theory are considered in recent works on
more complex models which: e.g., relax the potential entrant's assumption that the
current market price will be in effect after entry, Baron, Limit Pricing, Potential Entry,
and Barriers to Entry, 63 AM. EcoN. REV. 666, 667 (1973); make entry a stochastic event
whose probability depends on the market price-limit price gap, Kamien & Schwartz, Limit
Pricing and Uncertain Entry, 39 ECONOMERmICA 441 (1971); and include other detcrminants
of entry in addition to price, id. (rate of growth of demand). For one example of the
advantage in using a probabilistic model, compare Goldberg & Moirao, Limit Pricing and
Potential Competition, 81 J. POL. EcON. 1460 (1973), with Sherman 9- Willett, Potential
Entrants Discourage Entry, 75 J. POL. EcoN. 400 (1967).
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existing market price, there is no reason for the monopoly to engage
in limit pricing. Finally, credible price-cutting threats require partic-
ular demand and entry conditions in the market which may not be
fulfilled. The actual strategy followed by the monopoly will depend
on the structural characteristics of the given market, and may combine
elements of all three models.33
B. Legal Standards for Monopoly Pricing
A firm may lawfully acquire or maintain monopoly power under
the Sherman Act through "a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident."34 The innovator 35 and the natural monopoly30 are
both examples of legal monopolies. But the law puts limits on the
conduct by which the monopoly firm seeks to maintain its lawfully
acquired position; if it exceeds those limits, legal monopoly becomes
illegal monopolization.3 7
33. E.g., SCHERER, supra note 4, at 229, concludes that in the case of scale economy
barriers the firm would most likely follow a two part strategy of limit pricing to deter
small-scale entry and price-cutting threats to deter large-scale entry. See generally Spence,
supra note 26, at 1, 25-26 (suggesting that in a homogeneous product market the firm
will carry excess capacity, while in a nonhomogeneous market it will attempt to raise
entry barriers by advertising or exclusive dealing contracts).
34. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). But see Williamson,
Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1512 (1972) (arguing that a general § 2 exemption is unwarranted for monopolies
attributable to business acumen or historic accident).
The concept of lawful monopoly is well-established in antitrust law. See Standard Oil
Co. (N.J.) v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-50 (2d Cir. 1945) (monopoly "thrust upon" a firm not monop-
olization); Handler, supra note 9, at 933-34; Turner, The Definition of Agreement under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 667
(1962).
35. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946) (monopoly
achieved by "a new discovery or an original entry into a new field" distinguished from
illegal monopoly); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.
1945) (monopoly achieved by "superior skill, foresight, and industry" permitted by Sher-
man Act).
36. Courts have found natural monopolies in, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers
of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961);
Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For economic
definitions of natural monopoly, see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 13, at 191;
Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969).
37. The distinction between monopoly and monopolization has been a longstanding
issue in antitrust law. Early Supreme Court decisions implied that there was no monop-
olization unless the defendant had "abused" its monopoly power by resorting to pred-
atory practices. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United
,States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918). See United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 314-25 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954); Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. Cm. L. REV. 153, 157-60 (1947);
Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 44 (1937). A landmark case,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), and its aftermath
-American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100 (1948)-gave rise to a "power" theory of monopolization which stated that
mere possession of a monopoly, unless "thrust upon" the defendant, would suffice for
monopolization. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., supra, at 341-42; Rostow,
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The limits imposed by the law are directed to both the intent of
the monopoly firm and the effect of its activity. The law prohibits
any conduct which evinces a specific intent to acquire or maintain
monopoly power.38 But specific intent is not necessary for monopoliza-
tion.30 A firm may be liable under § 2 of the Sherman Act for normal
business practices-such as expansion of capacity or long-term leases-
which would have been legal if the firm had not already possessed
monopoly power.4° Regardless of intent, a monopoly may not artifici-
ally impede the entry or growth of competitors.4 '
The case law does not make clear whether any of the three alterna-
tive pricing strategies suggested by economic theory would transform
legal monopoly into illegal monopolization. The courts have not
analyzed the facts before them in terms of these models, and it is dif-
ficult to determine which model, if any, fits the facts of a particular
case. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some guidelines for monop-
oly pricing from several leading monopolization cases.
1. Umbrella pricing. No case has held that a monopoly may not
take maximum short-run profits, although it has been argued that an
unreasonably high price may violate § 2.42 The Supreme Court's land-
mark decision in United States v. United States Steel Corp.43 suggests
The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHi. L. REV. 567, 575-86
(1947). Some commentators have tried to classify monopolization cases according to these
two theories. See Note, Monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 22 S.C.L.
REV. 345 (1970); Note, Telex v. IBM: Implications for the Businessman and the Computer
Manufacturer, 60 VA. L. REv. 884, 896 (1974): "It is not clear which theory, the abuse
theory or the Alcoa possession theory, was used to find monopoly power" possessed by
IBM.
The better view is that monopolization requires more than power but less than abuse.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (separate conduct element,
defined by "willful acquisition or maintenance" test, see p. 566 supra, distinguishes
monopolization from monopoly); U.S. ATT'Y GEN.'s NAr'L CoMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws, REPORT 55 (1955) (using the term "deliberateness" to describe the additional ele-
ment required to turn monopoly into monopolization).
Commentators have recently suggested that a modified version of the "power" theory
be used against firms which retain a monopoly position for a substantial period of time.
Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1207, 1217-25 (1969); Williamson, supra note 34.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571, 576 (1966); Standard
Oil Co. (N.J.) v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1911).
39. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945).
Accord, United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
40. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
41. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 13, at 21-22; Handler, supra note 9, at 934.
42. Handler, supra note 9, at 936, and Turner, supra note 36, at 667, argue that the
courts have assumed an informal supervision over unregulated monopolies analogous to
that of public utility commissions over monopolies regulated by statute. Handler further
suggests that this supervision may extend to a prohibition against exploiting monopoly
power by high prices. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 426
(2d Cir. 1945).
43. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
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that a monopoly may escape § 2 condemnation by erecting a price
umbrella which allows competitors to enter and grow."4
2. Limit pricing. Two leading monopolization cases, United States
v. Aluminum Company of America,45 and United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,46 arguably imply that limit pricing by a mo-
nopoly constitutes illegal monopolization. In Alcoa, Judge Learned
Hand held that while Alcoa had legitimately acquired its monopoly
of virgin aluminum ingot by patents, 47 it had illegally maintained that
monopoly by expanding capacity to meet the eightfold growth of de-
mand for aluminum.48 The most plausible interpretation of the court's
findings on Alcoa's conduct is that Alcoa was limit pricing to preserve
its 100 percent share of domestic ingot production. 49 The decision
may be read to hold that a firm illegally monopolizes if it lowers price
and expands output in order to keep a predominant share of the
market. 50
44. Even though it was formed by a consolidation giving it 65 percent of the market,
223 F. 55, 65 (D.N.J. 1915), the U.S. Steel Corporation was held not to have monopolized
the steel industry. In a celebrated dictum, the Supreme Court said that "the law does not
make.., the existence of unexerted power an offense." 251 U.S. at 451. As evidence that
U.S. Steel had not exerted whatever power it possessed, the Court cited the erosion of the
company's market share in the 10 years after its formation, and the testimony of coi-
petitors that they were not in any way restrained by the company's prices. Id. at 446; see
223 F. at 65, 78, 92, 97. The Court seemed to equate umbrella pricing with unexerted
monopoly power and to imply that a monopoly could escape condemnation by keeping
prices high enough to allow competitors to enter and grow. Accord, United States v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927).
45. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
46. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
47. 148 F.2d at 422-23.
48. Judge Hand said that Alcoa effectively excluded competitors and forestalled entry
by "doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field." Id. at 431.
49. Expansion of capacity is necessary for limit pricing in a growing market. Unless
the firm maintains an efficient scale of production by staying on its long-run average
cost curve, market price will rise above the limit price as demand outstrips existing
capacity.
Alternative explanations of Alcoa's conduct are not plausible. Alcoa's expansion was
incompatible with an umbrella pricing strategy. An umbrella pricing firm would let its
capacity lag behind demand with the excess absorbed by new entrants. Moreover, there
are two ways in which Alcoa's expansion might have deterred entry while maximizing
short-run profits: depriving competitors of necessary raw materials to blockade entry (in
effect, raising the limit price above the umbrella price, see pp. 562-63 supra) or maintain-
ing excess capacity to make credible an implicit price-cutting threat, see p. 564 supra.
Both the barrier-raising and credible threat explanations are inconsistent with the
court's finding that Alcoa made only "fair" profits of approximately 10 percent on its
investment, 148 F.2d at 426, and thus was not taking maximum short-run profits. In ad-
dition, Judge Learned Hand accepted the trial court's finding that in acquiring ore de-
posits and water power sources which it did not fully use, Alcoa intended to provide for
its future supply and not to blockade entry by competitors. Id. at 432-34. But see C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 13, at 107.
50. "Alcoa meant to keep, and did keep, that complete and exclusive hold upon the
ingot market with which it started. That was to monopolize that market, however in-
nocently it otherwise proceeded." 148 F.2d at 432. See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 460(decision may be read to condemn "dominant market positions maintained merely
through limit pricing"). But see Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F.
Supp. 705, 719 (D. Hawaii 1964), aff'd per curiam, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1089 (1969) (holding insufficient in law the plaintiff's allegation that
the defendant baking company, which had 80 percent of the Hawaiian bread products
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United Shoe may be read as a restriction on limit pricing by a
multiproduct firm. The United Shoe Machinery Corp. had approxi-
mately 85 percent of the broadly defined shoe machinery market,0 '
and followed a general policy of preserving its market share by ac-
cepting lower profit margins where it faced competition. 2 Although
Judge Wyzanski did not rely on its differential profit margins for
his holding that United monopolized the shoe machinery market, 3
he did condemn them as a "buttress" to United's monopoly power. 54
He refused to enjoin the practice in his decree, because the probibition
would be impossible for a court to enforce. But under his reasoning
a monopoly firm might still be liable for treble damages if it reduces
prices selectively on individual products 6 within a broad market in
order to prevent competitors from taking a larger share.57
3. Credible threat pricing. American Tobacco Co. v. United States5
involved a clear example of credible threat pricing. The Big Three
cigarette producers cut prices to combat the rapid growth of the cheaper
"ten cent" brands during the Depression. Two of the Big Three sold
at a loss. A year later, after sales of ten cent brands had fallen from
23 percent to 6 percent of the national cigarette market, the Big Three
raised prices nearly to previous levels. The Supreme Court held this
activity to be circumstantial evidence of a specific intent to monop-
olize.59
market, kept its prices three cents below West Coast levels "to keep out mainland com-
petition, to forestall supermarkets from having their own bakeries, and to maintain
[defendants'] own position in the market").
51. 110 F. Supp. at 302-07.
52. Id. at 325-29; C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNrrE SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION
125-34 (1956) (memorandum to court by economist serving as law clerk to Judge Wyzan-
ski)..Note that both Kaysen and the court apply the term "discrimination" in its eco-
nomic, not legal, sense to mean differential profit margins on separate products.
Posner, supra note 27, at 531, interprets the United Shoe price reductions as umbrella
pricing responses to a more elastic demand. But United Shoe cut prices to preserve a
predominant market share, not to maximize short-term profits while allowing that share
to erode, and its strategy is therefore properly viewed as limit pricing. See generally
Disner, supra note 12, at 894.
53. United's leasing system was the crucial element in the illegal maintenance of its
monopoly power. 110 F. Supp. at 343-45.
54. Id. at 349. See id. at 340-41, 343.
55. Id. at 349.
56. Selective limit pricing may occur in different locations within a geographical
market as well as in different product lines with a single product market. In the former
case, it overlaps with the Robinson-Patman Act provision against area price discrimina-
tion, see note 5 supra, and is therefore outside the scope of this Note.
57. Judge Wyzanski's dictum that the monopoly might escape liability by "low prof-
its maintained permanently without discrimination," 110 F. Supp. at 342, does not
necessarily exempt even nonselective limit pricing, because limit pricing yields the max-
imum profits for the firm over the long run.
58. 329 U.S. 781, 805-07 (1946). See United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234
F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (L. Hand, J.), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
59. A long line of "predatory pricing" cases has held price-cutting by a monopoly
below its own costs to drive out competitors to be evidence of specific intent. E.g., United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160, 181-82 (1911); Credit Bureau Reports,
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 558, 1975
The legal standards applicable to each of the three types of pricing
behavior are not clearly defined by the case law. Taken together, U.S.
Steel, Alcoa, and United Shoe prefer umbrella pricing to limit pric-
ing.60 But, unlike pricing below one's own cost, limit pricing has not
been held to be evidence of a specific intent to monopolize. 1 Finally,
the monopoly might even be able to engage in credible threat pricing
by reducing its prices below a competitor's costs, provided that it does
not cut its prices below its own costs. 6 2
II. Telex and Limit Pricing
Telex v. IBM squarely presents the monopoly pricing issue. The
district court defined the relevant market as peripheral equipment that
is plug-compatible with IBM computers 3 and held that IBM possessed
monopoly power in that market. 4 When IBM introduced its System
Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 791-93 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd on other grounds,
476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Stupp. 373,
378 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp.
476, 483-86 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). See Note, Sales Below Cost
Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing under State Law, 57 YALE L.J. 391, 399 n.27 (1949).
60. Posner, supra note 27, at 532.
61. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
62. The predatory pricing cases have not condemned price cuts that were below a
competitor's costs but above the monopoly's costs. Courts have approved price cuts below
a competitor's costs by a firm fighting for survival in a natural monopoly market. See
Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 143 (D. Mass.
1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); Lamb
Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1001 (1972); American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 131
(4th Cir. 1963); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 803-04 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
63. The court also defined submarkets in five classes of peripheral devices: tape
drives, disk drives, memories, printers, and communications controllers. 367 F. Supp. at
282. The peripheral equipment of a computer system consists of the auxiliary devices
which perform input, output, and storage functions. Peripherals attach to the central
processing unit (CPU), which performs computations and logical operations. A peripheral
device is "plug-compatible" with a given CPU if it fits the electronic specifications of
the CPU and thus can be used with that CPU. 367 F. Supp. at 274-75; Note, supra note
37, at 885. The term "peripherals" may be somewhat misleading, because peripheral
products account for 50 to 75 percent of the price of a computer system. 367 F. Supp.
at 277.
64. 367 F. Supp. at 291, 340. This Note assumes that the Telex court was correct both
in defining the market to be peripheral equipment that is plug-compatible with IBM
computers and in holding that IBM possessed monopoly power in that market. Both
issues raise difficult questions. The Telex market definition has been criticized in the
literature. See Posner, supra note 27, at 521 (market "incorrectly defined" in Telex case);
Rostow, The Origins and Intent of Antitrust Law, THINK, July-Aug. 1974, at 63-64. The
court's determination of monopoly power is also open to challenge. Its findings that
entry was "initially easy for plug-compatible manufacturers" and that their entry "sub-
stantially eroded" IBM's market share, 367 F. Supp. at 286-87, suggest that IBM may
not have possessed the requisite "power to control prices or exclude competition." Id. at
335. See N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493, 515-17 (D. Del.
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360 computers in 1964, it had a legitimate 100 percent share of the
market for its own peripherals.a However, new entrants, including
plaintiff Telex, rapidly eroded IBM's share. In 1970, IBM responded
by cutting prices and offering one- and two-year leases at substantial
discounts under its Fixed Term Plan (FTP).6 6 The court held that by
its pricing and leasing practices, 67 IBM monopolized and attempted
to monopolize in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
Of the three economic models presented in Part I, limit pricing best
describes IBM's price reductions.0 8 The court's holding that these
price reductions violated § 2 is a clear prohibition against limit pric-
ing by a monopoly firm.
A. The Economic Model in Telex
Both umbrella pricing and credible threat pricing have been urged
as interpretations of IBM's pricing behavior. Professor Posner has sug-
gested that IBM was following an umbrella strategy. 69 He explains the
1971); United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 879-80, 892, 900 (D. Md. 1915). The
Telex court reasoned that this entry had occurred before IBM exercised its market power
against PCM's, and therefore did not negate the existence of monopoly power. 367 F.
Supp. at 287.
65. 367 F. Supp. at 287, 306.
66. By 1970, IBM's share of disk and tape drives installed on its computers had
dropped to 94 percent and 80 percent respectively, with forecasts of further losses in
those markets and in printers and memory products. Id. at 287, 297-99, 304. In response
to increasing plug-compatible competition, IBM made four substantial price reductions:
the first two by repackaging its standard disk drive (2314) in a lower priced model
(2319A and B), the third by reducing prices between 20 and 35 percent on one- and two-
year leases of a variety of disk, tape, and printer devices under its Fixed Term Plan
(FTP), and the fourth by introducing new low priced memory technology. Id. at 293, 295,
299, 304. This Note treats the FTP and the 2319 only as price cuts.
67. This Note does not discuss IBM's leases, apart from the price reductions which
accompanied them. However, the holding that the leases violated the Sherman Act raises
substantial problems. Compare IBM's optional one- and two-year leases, 367 F. Supp. at
299, 346, with those held to monopolize in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110
F. Supp. 295, 314-25 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
68. IBM's position at trial and on appeal fits none of the models. IBM argued that it
was in a competitive market which forced it to cut price to meet the price set by com-
petitors. IBM Proposed Findings of Fact, at 113-25, and Conclusions of Law, at 30-32. See
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 78, 87-88, 92, IBM Corp. v. Telex Corp. (10th Cir., filed
Feb. 7, 1974) [hereinafter cited as IBM APPEAL BRIEF]. Even if IBM did not have monop-
oly power, its dominant market share, 10 percent cost advantage and ability to com-
mand a premium for its products, 367 F. Supp. at 287-90, 294, 345, would give it enough
power over price to make the economic models of Part I relevant to an analysis of its
pricing behavior. IBM predicted that its competitors' shares would increase only to be-
tween 20 and 50 percent of the peripherals market by 1976 even if it did not reduce
price at all, id. at 299-300, indicating that IBM's demand curve was far from horizontal.
69. Posner, supra note 27, at 521:
As a result [of Telex's entry] the demand curve facing IBM became more elastic, the
profit-maximizing monopoly price fell, and IBM lowered its price.
See note 16 supra. Posner's view of IBM's price reductions leads him to interpret the
decision as requiring the monopoly to hold price above the short-run profit-maximizing
level once entry occurs-in effect, as freezing the price at the pre-entry umbrella level.
Posner, supra note 27, at 527. This "curious" and "inadvertent" result, id. at 530, may
be avoided by using either of the other two monopoly pricing models to analyze the case.
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reductions as the result of short-run profit maximization taking into
account the quantity supplied by the new entrants at a given price. In
this view, IBM simply repeated its pre-entry price calculation subject
to a new constraint which made its demand curve more elastic.
This view overlooks what the court saw as crucially important: IBM
intended its price cuts to impede the growth of existing competitors
and forestall entry into other plug-compatible peripheral markets.70
After initial disk drive price reductions failed to stop the erosion of
its market share, IBM made further price cuts of between 20 and 35
percent.71 It also took action to forestall potential entry in the printer
and memory submarkets where it did not yet face any actual plug-
compatible competition. Top management assigned task forces to de-
termine the price at which plug-compatible competitors could enter
the memory market,72 and extended FTP discounts to printers as well
as disk and tape drives.73 This focus on competitors' potential entry
and future growth is inconsistent with an umbrella strategy and sug-
gests a limit pricing strategy of sacrificing current profits to stop a
projected loss of market share.
Telex's theory of the case was that IBM's price reductions were part
of a credible threat strategy. Telex emphasized that IBM cut prices
selectively on peripheral products facing plug-compatible competi-
tion,74 and argued that the lower prices would only last until plug-
compatible competitors were driven out of the market.la The mere
fact of selective price reductions does not establish that IBM was
following a credible threat strategy, since different profit margins by a
multiproduct monopoly such as IBM are consistent with dynamic limit
pricing behavior.7 6 The crucial question is whether the reductions
70. 367 F. Supp. at 293, 297, 345.
71. Id. at 299.
72. Id. at 304.
73. id. at 298.
74. Telex's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Relating to Telex's
Antitrust Claims at 60, 80-81, 90-91, Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D.
Okla. 1973) [hereinafter cited as TELEX PROPOSED FINDINGS]; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at
75-76, IBM Corp. v. Telex Corp., No. 73-1874-1878, 1961-62 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 9, 1974),
at 49-50, 57-58, 70-72 [hereinafter cited as TELEX APPEAL BRIEF]. The court found that the
reduced price 2319A disk drive could be used only with one model of IBM's System 370
computers, 367 F. Supp. at 293; that IBM omitted some categories of peripherals (e.g., card
readers) from its FTP discounts and included only some of its disk and tape drive and
printer models, id. at 298-99; and that IBM simultaneously maintained or raised its
prices for CPU's, id. at 300, 304.
75. Record at 4512-4529 (Telex cross-examination of IBM economic expert), 6646-49,
6831-35 (oral argument). The Telex theory is clearly stated on appeal in TELEX APPEAL
BRIEF, supra note 74, at 75-77 (arguing that IBM had maintained a price umbrella be-
fore Telex entered and that IBM intended to do so again after it eliminated its plug-
compatible competitors).
76. See p. 563 supra.
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were a temporary lesson-teaching tactic intended to enable IBM to
raise a price umbrella without attracting new entrants.77
The court's findings provide no convincing evidence that IBM
followed a credible threat strategy. IBM did not reduce its price
below its own costs or even its competitors' prices.78 It did not drive
its plug-compatible competitors out of the market; at worst, it con-
tained them by preventing further growth.7 9 Even assuming that IBM
intended to drive them out, the court did not find that IBM intended
to raise its prices afterward.80
The economic structure of the peripherals market would make it
difficult to establish credible price-cutting threats, and it is unlikely
that IBM would pursue such a strategy. Demand was growing rapidly,81
hampering any attempt at output restriction and making entry attrac-
tive to new competitors. Suppliers of peripherals for non-IBM com-
puters could enter the market easily whenever IBM reinstated a price
umbrella.82 Economists who have carefully analyzed other cases involv-
77. See note 27 supra.
78. In its amended findings filed one month after the initial decision, the court stated
that IBM's reduced prices were intended to return a 20 percent profit, id. at 306, and
were above the prices of its plug-compatible competitors except in four isolated instances,
id. at 299. However, the court did not change its original finding, inconsistent with the
amendments, that IBM tape drive prices were below, and were planned to be below,
those of plug-compatible competitors. Id. at 345.
The relationship between the prices of IBM and those of its competitors is difficult to
determine because of the premium commanded by IBM's substantially equivalent products.
Id. Depending on the magnitude of this premium, IBM's reduction could be viewed as
effectively below, even though nominally above, Telex's price. See Power Replacements
Corp. v. Air Preheater Co., 356 F. Supp. 872, 890, 898 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Although an
upper bound can be calculated, the size of the premium cannot be estimated exactly
from the 20 to 50 percent price differentials existing before IBM's reduction, since IBM's
market share was then rapidly declining. See G. Brock, supra note 1, at 128-29.
79. 367 F. Supp. at 302. The court relied on statistics which showed a leveling of the
market shares of IBM's competitors after the IBM price cuts. Id. at 288. The market
share charts included in the court's amended findings, however, show that this leveling
was due to adding together the statistics for third and fourth generation peripherals.
Competitors' shares for third generation equipment doubled after the IBM price cuts,
but were balanced in the aggregate by IBM's new leases of fourth generation equipment
which rapidly replaced the third generation and for which plug-compatible competitors
did not yet have a copy. Id. at 288-90. Thus the leveling of plug-compatible shares, on
which the court based its finding of "containing" competition, may be attributable to
IBM product innovation rather than price cuts.
80. Given IBM's past and pending antitrust problems from 1969 to 1972, e.g., United
States v. IBM Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 71117 (S.D.N.Y.) (consent decree); United States v.
IBM Corp., [1961-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 45,069, at 52,707 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(complaint filed), a blatantly predatory act such as restoring former price levels after
eliminating Telex seems highly unlikely; cf. M. ADELMAN, A&P: A ST DY IN PRIcE-Cosr
BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 407-10 (1959).
81. 367 F. Supp. at 285.
82. Entry in the plug-compatible market was "initially easy," and in six years the
number of firms in the market grew from two or three to 100. Id. at 286-87. Suppliers of
peripherals compatible with non-IBM systems could develop, at a modest cost, an inter-
face which would enable them to shift to the production of IBM-compatible equipment.
Id. at 278. The court's suggestion that predatory pricing could make easy entry difficult,
id., puts the cart before the horse: Easy entry makes predatory pricing difficult. See note
29 supra.
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ing allegedly predatory price-cutting in markets with low entry barriers
have concluded that relatively easy entry made predatory pricing un-
attractive and that the price-cutter was actually following an umbrella
or limit pricing strategy.83
On the facts found by the court, the dynamic limit pricing model is
the best description of IBM's price behavior.8 4 IBM sought to preserve
its market share by trading short-run gains for maximum long-run
profits. It sought to limit the share of existing and potential com-
petitors by permanent reduction to a limit price, not by a temporary
reduction to a lesson-teaching price.
B. The Telex Rule Against Limit Pricing
The Telex holding is a prohibition against limit pricing far stronger
and more explicit than any implied by prior cases. The court first held
that IBM's price cuts illegally maintained its monopoly under the
Grinnell "willful acquisition or maintenance" test, which does not
require specific intent to monopolize8 5 Even without predatory intent,
IBM was found to have monopolized by (1) lowering prices only on
those types of peripherals facing the most threatening plug-compatible
challenge, and (2) offsetting price cuts on peripherals by raising or
maintaining prices on central processing units (CPU's).8 6 As to the
first rationale, the court could have adopted the suggestion in United
Shoe that a firm monopolizes if it selectively reduces prices on products
83. Three cases in which economists have found no predatory pricing are: (1) Standard
Oil Co. (N.J.) v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (see McGhee, supra note 27, at 142, 168
(umbrella pricing); SCHERER, supra note 4, at 275-76 (selective limit pricing)). (2) United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 188 F. 127 (C.C.D. Del. 1911) (see Elzinga, Pred-
atory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J. LAw & EcoN. 223, 236-37 (1970)
(umbrella or limit pricing)). (3) United States v. New York Great At. & Pac. Tea Co.,
173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949) (see M. ADELMAN, supra note 80, at 14, 372-79, 407-10).
84. It is possible that IBM did erect a price umbrella from 1966 to 1969 before it
recognized the threat posed by plug-compatible competitors. If so, its behavior would fit
the special case of dynamic limit pricing modelled by Pashigan, supra note 24, in which
the firm switches from short-run profit-maximizing to limit pricing at some point in the
erosion of its share. The important point is that for the years relevant to Telex-1969 to
1972, see 367 F. Supp. at 306-IBM was clearly limit pricing.
This "switch-over" model seems to fit one discussion of IBM's pricing behavior, see
Note, supra note 37, at 897-99, although the economic analysis in that discussion is some-
what unclear: IBM maintained a price umbrella before 1970 because it sought "unusually
high" profits in peripherals to recover its research and development costs, id. at 899; it
then -eliminated plug-compatible competitors by meeting their prices in an "ordinary
competitive manner." Id. at 898. However, the umbrella price is determined by the
interaction of marginal revenue and marginal costs, not by the recovery of sunk costs. Sec
note 16 supra. In addition, "meeting competitors' prices" was effectively cutting to or
below the limit price, because of the premium commanded by IBM's reputation for
reliability and maintenance. See note 78 supra.
85. See pp. 566-67 supra.
86. 367 F. Supp at 341.
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within a given market in which it has monopoly power.8 7 The court's
offset theory, however, appears to have no legal or economic basis.88
The court put IBM in the unlikely posture of subsidizing reductions
in the peripherals market, where the court found that IBM had mo-
nopoly power, with increases in the CPU market, where the court
did not find monopoly power.8 9
The court went further: It held that IBM's price cuts were pred-
atory acts manifesting a specific intent to monopolize.90 The court
relied on IBM's intent to contain existing competitors and preserve its
market share in the disk and tape submarkets. 91 The court also cited
IBM's attempt to prevent entry into the memory submarket by limit
pricing; even though unsuccessful in deterring entry, IBM intended
to monopolize because, in the court's view, IBM attempted "to fix a
price for ... memory that would influence potential plug-compatible
competitors to stay out of the market."9 2
87. See p. 569 supra. The United Shoe authority on selective price reductions was
not argued to or cited by the court.
However, there is a substantial difficulty in applying this United Shoe principle in
Telex. The "selectiveness" of multiproduct limit pricing may be due simply to overly
broad market definition. There should be substantial cross-elasticity of demand or in-
terchangeability of use among all products included in the same market. United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 410 (1956). If the price of one product
is decreased, consumers will substitute that product for others in the market, putting
downward pressure on the prices of those other products. Selective price reductions will
therefore tend to spread throughout the market, unless it includes products among which
there is little cross-elasticity of demand. This argument raises the question of whether
peripheral products on which IBM did not cut prices, e.g., card readers, 367 F. Supp. at
298, should have been included in the relevant market.
88. There seems to be no Sherman Act case which held differential price-cost margins
in separate and distinct product markets to be illegal. Although the court did not cite
authority for its offset theory, it might have reasoned from an analogy to Robinson-
Patman cases involving price discrimination between purchasers in different geographical
markets. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
89. 367 F. Supp. at 285-86. Even assuming that IBM had a monopoly in the CPU
market but not in the peripherals market, a more fundamental problem with the offset
theory is that if the firm is already exploiting monopoly power in the subsidizing (CPU)
market, raising price will lower its profits. An offset or cross-subsidization strategy makes
economic sense only for a firm operating in both regulated and competitive markets: By
charging lower prices in the competitive market, it may be able to expand the rate base
and increase its overall profit. See Noll & Rivlin, Regulating Prices in Competitive
Markets, 82 YALE L.J. 1426, 1427-28 (1973).
90. 367 F. Supp. at 345. Because it found specific intent, the court also held that IBM
violated § 2 by an attempt to monopolize. Attempt to monopolize requires a specific
intent to acquire monopoly power and a "dangerous probability" of doing so. See, e.g.,
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Cooper, Attempts and Monop-
olization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72
MICH. L. REv. 376, 378-408 (1974).
91. 367 F. Supp. at 345. To describe IBM's intent the court used the words "contain,"
"retard growth," "suppress," and "eliminate" almost interchangeably, suggesting that it
saw little legal significance in the differences among them. See, e.g., id. at 295, 306, 345.
92. Id. at 304. On appeal, IBM argued that the court had confused two entirely distinct
memory products-the old core type announced in 1970 with the first two models of
System 370, and the new FET type announced in 1972. According to IBM, its task force
estimated in 1970 that competitors would not be viable if they produced the first type
at less than $6,000 per month, but IBM's price on the old product was set at 512,000 per
575
The Yale Law Journal
Telex makes new law. There was no classic predatory behavior in
the case. IBM did not cut prices below its own costs or discriminate in
price between purchasers.9 3 The decision goes beyond the suggestions
of earlier case law and holds that limit pricing is predatory. It prohibits
the monopoly from setting a price low enough to prevent entry. When
entry occurs, the monopoly is not allowed to reduce its price to stop
the growth of new entrants. Under the Telex rule, the firm has no
choice but to take short-run profits and face the steady erosion of its
market share.
III. The Arguments for Limit Pricing
A. The Economic Rationale for Limit Pricing: The Lowest Attain-
able Market Price
The economic goals of antitrust policy are efficiency in the alloca-
tion of resources and maximization of consumer welfare.94 These goals
are fulfilled in a purely competitive market, where the long-run equi-
librium price in the market is equal to the marginal cost and the
minimum average cost of the representative firm in the market' 3 The
monopoly's long- and short-run market power enables it to maintain
a price above the optimal level which would prevail in a purely com-
petitive market. The closer the monopoly price to the competitive
result the better the outcome in the market from an economic stand-
point.
The umbrella price is above the marginal cost, because the monop-
oly's control over the market enables it to raise the price to a profit-
maximizing level without losing all its business to existing competitors.
As entry occurs, the umbrella price falls, but remains above the op-
timum as long as the firm's share remains large enough to give it
month; two years later IBM announced its new memory at $5,200-below the $6,000 limit
price for old memory but above the $2,700 price at which IBM believed Telex could
produce new memory. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 91-94, IBM Corp. v. Telex Corp.,
appeal docketed, Nos. 73-1874 to 1878, 1961, 1962, 10th Cir., Nov. 30, 1973 (filed Feb. 7,
1974). The court's finding that competitors have announced new memory at "prices sub-
stantially below" IBM's, see 367 F. Supp. at 304, supports IBM's view of the facts. On
these facts, IBM tried to retard entry in the memory submarket rather than prevent it
altogether.
93. See notes 5, 59 supra.
94. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 13, at 12; Bork, The Goals of Antitrust, 57 Am.
EcoN. REV. 242 (Supp. May 1967) (goal of antitrust is "consumer welfare, defined as
minimizing restrictions of output and permitting efficiency, however gained, to have its
way"); Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 365 (1965).
95. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 12-13. This is the reason economists refer to the socially
optimal price and output in a market as the "competitive result," and the reason they
prefer competition to monopoly as a form of market organization. See id. at 18-19.
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some power over price. The gap between the umbrella price and
marginal cost produces excess profits and misallocation of resources 6
In addition, the umbrella pricing monopoly relinquishes some of its
market share to less efficient new entrants.07 Factors of production
which are already underutilized in the market due to monopolistic
output restriction are further misallocated to higher cost producers."8








See note 16 supra for further explanations of Figure 2. At the competitive price C, output
Qc is produced and resources are efficiently allocated. See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 18-19.
Consumers receive a "surplus" of value DCB above what they pay for output Q0, and
there are no excess profits (since cost includes a normal return to capital). At the short-run
profit-maximizing price U, the monopoly earns excess profits CUVW. There is also a
"deadweight" loss of VWB due to misallocation of resources, which is lost by consumers
but not gained by the monopoly. Id. at 13-19, 401.
97. Because a monopoly may not lawfully erect artificial barriers to the entry of
competitors, see p. 567 supra, the advantages a legitimate monopoly has over its com-
petitors should be related to its efficiency. But see note 102 infra.
98. This explains why limit pricing increases both consumer welfare and long-run
monopoly profits: An umbrella pricing monopoly must share its excess profits with less
efficient producers, while a limit pricing monopoly will increase output and give the con-
sumer a lower price, but keep all excess profits obtained at the limit price.
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brella pricing. Limit pricing will not occur unless the limit price is
below the initial umbrella price. 99 Even though the umbrella price
declines as entry occurs, it can never fall below the limit price, since
potential or actual competitors cannot enter or expand at any price
below the limit price.' 00 The barriers which prevent the monopolist's
competitors from entering or expanding below the limit price con-
tinue to operate if the competitors do enter or expand under a price
umbrella.' 0 ' The only way to obtain a market price below the existing
limit price is to reduce the barriers and thereby lower the limit price.102
Even the dynamic limit price, which is above the absolute entry-
forestalling limit price and permits some entry, is always below the
umbrella price.10 3 Because of its lower price, the limit pricing firm
99. See pp. 562-63 supra.
100. See p. 562 supra.
101. It may be argued that competitors who gain a toehold under a price umbrella
may be able to overcome the barriers and ultimately to produce at a lower price than the
initial limit price. For example, the new entrant may grow to an efficient scale where it
can compete with the monopoly; it may "learn by doing" and reduce the monopoly's
cost advantage; or it may gain customer and investor confidence after prospering under a
price umbrella and thereby lower its cost of capital and its selling costs. The answer to
this argument is that disadvantages which the firm can overcome by toehold entry are
really not barriers at all. A barrier permits the monopoly to raise its price persistently
above the minimum average costs. See p. 560 supra. The term "persistently" is used to
give a structural, long-run (i.e., five or ten years) aspect to the definition of entry barriers.
J. BAIN, supra note 12, at 7.
Lack of production know-how and trained personnel constitute a temporary and
nominal disadvantage to the new entrant, and such negligible barriers would never be
reflected in the "limit price. Id. at 148-49. Similarly, a new entrant will be able to grow to
an efficient scale only if it faces an insignificant scale economy barrier. Scale economies
impede entry or expansion not so much because of the "absolute capital requirement
effect"--the need for large amounts of capital investment to achieve an efficient scale-
but because of the "percentage effect"- where the efficient scale is a significant propor-
tion of total industry capacity, entry at that scale can depress the market price below the
entrant's costs. Id. at 53-56. A firm which is able to grow to optimal size without de-
pressing market price below its costs is facing at most an absolute capital requirements
effect, not a percentage effect. The capital requirements effect depends on the existence
of imperfections in the capital market and constitutes a barrier of questionable signifi-
cance. Id. at 165. Reducing capital costs by acquiring investor confidence also depends
on capital market imperfections. If in fact those imperfections exist, there are better ways
of correcting them (e.g., interest subsidies, accelerated depreciation, encouragement of
large-firm diversification, id. at 215-16) than by inviting higher cost producers into the
market.
It is of course true that the limit price may decline over time due to, e.g., technological
diffusion, tariff repeal, or patent expiration. But such decline is not likely to result from
the mere presence of competitors protected by a price umbrella. Any disadvantages over-
come in this way should be ignored by potential entrants in estimating the limit price.
102. Williamson argues that market failure may permit the retention of a dominant
position by a firm without efficiency-related advantages over its competitors. In this case,
divestiture may be an appropriate remedy, although the threat of divestiture may en-
courage inefficient umbrella pricing to avoid attaining the threshold market share for a
violation. Williamson, supra note 34, at 1527 & n.57; Turner, supra note 37, at 1221.
103. Gaskins, supra note 24, at 310-11, proves this result mathematically. Intuitively,
since higher current prices imply lower future profits due to increased entry, the firm
will price lower in the current period if it is balancing current against future profits (i.e.,




allocates more resources to production in the monopoly market, and
distributes some monopoly profits to the consumer. 10 4 Given the
initial monopoly position and existing entry barriers, limit pricing
yields the best attainable economic results in the market.
Of the three economic models of monopoly pricing, only credible
threat pricing should be illegal under the § 2 standard of "willful
acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly power. Limit and umbrella
pricing make use of existing market power; credible threat pricing
adds to that power. Umbrella pricing exploits the short-run market
power conferred by existing market share to maximize short-run profits.
It ignores the constraint of potential competition and thereby results
in an erosion of market share. Limit pricing exploits the long-run
market power conferred by existing entry barriers to maximize long-
run profits. It is a concession of the monopoly firm to the fact that
the barriers are not high enough to allow it to price unconstrained by
potential competitors. Credible threat pricing, on the other hand,
creates an artificial barrier to competitors and allows the firm to um-
brella price without losing its market share.
The Telex court made a fundamental economic error when it held
that IBM's limit pricing was an attempt to create a barrier to entry.'05
To require umbrella pricing by the monopoly firm deprives con-
sumers of the lowest attainable market price. From an economic stand-
point, limit pricing should be encouraged, not condemned, under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.10
B. The Legal Rationale for Limit Pricing: The "Perceived Potential
Entrant" Concept under § 7 of the Clayton Act
In its theory of potential competition developed in a line of merger
cases under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 0 7 the Supreme Court has viewed
104. In Figure 2, supra note 96, output increases to QL at the limit price L, monopoly
profits decrease to LMNC, and the misallocation loss decreases to MNB. The result is a
redistribution of income to consumers and an increase in allocative efficiency (assuming
no second-best problems. SCHERr, supra note 4, at 22-26).
105. 367 F. Supp. at 304.
106. Limit pricing necessarily excludes less efficient potential competitors. It may
therefore conflict with the noneconomic or social goal of antitrust policy-the protection
of small business. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-29 (2d
Cir. 1945); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 13, at 17-18, 22. See M. ADELMAN, supra
note 80, at 418-25; Harlan & Blake, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. Rtv. 377, 382-84
(1965). Umbrella pricing protects competitors, but only by sacrificing the economic goals.
The monopoly pricing issue forces the courts to choose between protecting competitors by
requiring umbrella pricing or serving allocative efficiency and consumer welfare by
encouraging limit pricing. A line of Supreme Court decisions under § 7 of the Clayton
Act provides strong legal authority for the limit pricing alternative.
107. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974); United States
v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 94 S. Ct. 2788 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
410 U.S. 526 (1973); FTC v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v.
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limit pricing as the beneficial influence of potential entrants on a
concentrated market, not as an exclusionary tactic which maintains
monopoly or increases market power. This favorable view of limit
pricing under the Clayton Act is inconsistent with judicial disapproval
under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court has held that a merger between an established
firm and a "perceived potential entrant"'0 8 may be illegal if it elim-
inates the restraining effect exerted on firms in the market by the
potential competitor on the edge.' 0 9 The firms already in the market
perceive the potential competitor as a likely entrant and reduce price
to deter its entry; in other words, the presence of the perceived poten-
tial entrant forces the established firms to engage in limit pricing.'"
The Court's reason for prohibiting the merger is to preserve the poten-
tial entrant as an impetus to limit pricing."' There is no suggestion in
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376
U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal.
1973), affd mem., 94 S. Ct. 3199 (1974); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp.
407 (E.D. Mich. 1968), aff'd, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). The Court's potential competition doctrine
has generated a wealth of commentary. See, e.g., Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate Mergers
and Criteria for Defining Potential Entrants, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 489 (1970); Handler,
Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1668-80 (1967); Robinson,
Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 COLUMi. L. REv. 163, 180-90 (1974); Turner, Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1362-86 (1965); Note,
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.-Potential Competition under § 7 of the Clayton
Act, 38 ALB. L. REV. 348 (1974); Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation:
Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 MICH. L. REV. 837 & n.2 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Michigan Note]; Note, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrinc,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 156 (1972); Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: An
Examination of Potential Competition, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545 (1973).
108. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856, 2878 (1974); United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). The Court
has used a variety of other terms: e.g., "on-the-fringe potential competition" (id. at 534
n.13, 537), "wings effect" (United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., supra, at 2871).
See also United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1232-34 (C.D. Cal.
1973) ("edge effect"), aff'd mem., 94 S. Ct. 3199 (1974).
109. In addition to the "perceived potential entrant" effect, there is a second major
branch of the potential competition doctrine: the likelihood that a potential competitor
may actually enter the market on its own by establishing a new plant. The merger of an
"actual potential entrant" with a firm already in the market eliminates the possibility of
de novo entry (or toehold acquisition) by the potential competitor and the resulting
stimulus to competition in the market. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410
U.S. 526, 560-62 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). For a case reaching this second branch,
see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856, 2872 (1974).
110. The Court has referred in general terms to the perceived potential entrant's
"beneficial influence on competitive conditions" without specifying the economic model
underlying its analysis. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33
(1974). But see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). However, commentators were quick to point out that the "perceived potential
entrant" effect relied on the limit pricing model. See Berger & Peterson, supra note 107,
at 490-93; Handler, supra note 107, at 1671; Turner, supra note 107, at 1362-65; Michigan
Note, supra note 107, at 841-53.
111. It may be argued that the Court is preserving potential entrants in order to
require umbrella pricing which would invite them to enter. But the Court has said that
its perceived potential entrant concept will apply even to a potential competitor unwilling
or unable to enter on its own. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,
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the § 7 cases or commentary 12 of the Telex view that limit pricing
ought to be discouraged because it excludes potential competitors from
the market. Rather, the Court has tried to insure that the lowest at-
tainable price will prevail.
It may be argued that § 7 limit pricing cases are not relevant to suits
arising under § 2. Section 7 cases have involved oligopoly markets with
several sellers,113 rather than monopoly markets dominated by one
firm. But oligopoly and monopoly limit pricing are the same economic
phenomenon. Oligopolists will limit price only if they are acting like
a joint monopoly."14 The Court's theory in attacking horizontal mergers
under § 7 has been precisely that oligopoly closely approximates mo-
nopoly pricing behavior.-";
Section 7 was amended to supplement the Sherman Act, which was
thought not to reach certain mergers with anticompetitive effects,."6
To violate § 7 a merger must result only in a probability of substanti-
ally lessening competition, 117 not in a restraint of trade as required
under § 1 of the Sherman Act or the power to control prices necessary
under § 2."1 Even though the stringency of the test varies, however, a
532-33 (1973). See generally United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226,
1234 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 94 S. Ct. 3199 (1974). The Court's theory in these cases
would seem to rest exclusively on encouraging the lowest possible price.
112. The desirability of limit pricing in a concentrated market, see pp. 576-79 supra,
has generally been assumed in legal (and economic) analysis of limit pricing; the con-
troversy has centered around whether limit pricing does in fact occur. Commentators have
criticized the Court for neglecting the structural assumptions of the limit pricing model
in its use of the "perceived potential entrant" concept. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 107,
at 1672-75; Michigan Note, supra note 107, at 842-48. The Court's most recent decision on
potential competition shows a closer attention to the assumptions necessary for a "per-
ceived potential entrant" effect. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct.
2856, 2878-79 (1974) (acquiring bank not "perceived potential entrant" where regulatory
barriers blockaded entry). Some commentators have suggested that these assumptions are
so restrictive and unrealistic that limit pricing theory is of limited use in analyzing real
world markets. See Berger & Peterson, supra note 107, at 490-93; Michigan Note, supra
note 107, at 848-49. While these commentators are surely right in insisting that the
assumptions be explicitly satisfied before the theory is applied to a particular market,
their criticisms of the theory ignore the more sophisticated dynamic and probabilistic
models which have replaced the simplistic early formulation. See p. 563 & note 32 supra.
113. See cases cited in note 107 supra (least concentrated market to which "perceived
potential entrant" concept applied is four firms with 61 percent of the New England beer
market. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973)).
114. Oligopoly limit pricing assumes that firms tacitly or explicitly collude to maxi-
mize joint profits. See SCHaaR, supra note 4, at 157, 218-19; notes 18, 19 supra.
115. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). See Brodley,
Oligopoly Power under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal
Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967).
116. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 & n.33 (1962).
117. Id. at 323, 325.
118. For leading merger cases under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), see
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291
(1930); United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v. Reading
Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912). The
latter three cases found a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act as well.
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finding of a violation of any of these sections requires conclusions
about the anticompetitive effects of market conduct. These conclusions
should be measured by the same standard of market performance. The
difference in the degree of market power required to trigger § 2 and
§ 7 cannot justify a position that limit pricing is good under one
statute but bad under the other.
Early cases under amended § 7 took the view that the greater degree
of market power required under § 2 made its test for defining the
relevant market inapplicable to § 7 cases. 119 In its first decision 2u
under the new merger statute, however, the Supreme Court not only
rejected this view but introduced a new "submarket" concept 121 which
it subsequently approved as a § 2 standard as well. 22 The courts have
preserved consistency in their criteria for defining the relevant market
under both sections; they should also do so in their criteria for eval-
uating conduct within that market. 123
A § 2 restriction on limit pricing would result in inconsistent treat-
ment of the same economic phenomenon under two statutes with the
119. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588, 593 &
n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
120. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
121. Id. at 325.
122. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1966). Lower courts have
subsequently found submarkets under § 2. See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers,
Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (southern
California orange submarket, relying on four § 7 cases); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v.
Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 790 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d
989 (5th Cir. 1973) (credit reporting market divided into four submarkets).
123. Telex involves a particular misconstruction of § 7 precedent. The court relied
on § 7 cases in limiting the market to IBM-compatible peripherals and in delineating
separate submarkets for individual types of peripherals. 367 F. Supp. at 336-37. Failing in
its argument that the relevant market should include all computer systems because of
substitution among components by users on the demand side, IBM argued that other
systems should be included because of substitution on tle supply side-the ability of
other computer systems manufacturers to produce IBM-compatible peripherals inter-
changeably with peripherals for their own systems. Id. at 280, 283-84, 338. In support of
its "supply substitutability" theory, IBM cited the perceived potential entrant cases under
§7.
The court was correct in distinguishing these cases, but not because, as one commenta-
tor has suggested, Note, supra note 37, at 889-90, they are inapplicable under § 2. The
Supreme Court first used the concept of supply substitutability to define the market in
a Sherman Act vertical merger case, see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
510-11 (1948), and later approved it for use in vertical mergers under § 7, see Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962). Thus another Sherman Act
market definition concept was transferred into § 7.
The perceived potential entrant cases do not involve supply substitutability at all. They
are concerned with the influence of potential competitors on the conduct of firms inside
an already defined market, not with the definition of the boundaries of that market. In
fact, the theory behind these cases is that the potential competitors will not actually
supply buyers in the market because existing firms will engage in limit pricing to prevent
entry. After correctly distinguishing these cases on the market definition issue, however,
the Telex court ignored them where they were relevant: the issue of IBM's conduct within
the market.
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same economic purpose. Such inconsistency could lead to strange and
unjustifiable consequences. For example, a potential competitor could
sue a dominant firm under § 2 for excluding it by limit pricing;124 but
if it tried to buy the dominant it could be sued for eliminating the
limit pricing.
To encourage limit pricing under one section of the antitrust laws
but disallow it under another cannot be an effective antitrust policy.
To achieve consistency, the § 7 view of limit pricing should be adopted
under § 2. The § 7 view has the greater weight of legal as well as eco-
nomic authority. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed its "per-
ceived potential entrant" concept in § 7 cases, while it has never dealt
explicitly with limit pricing under § 2. The restriction against limit
pricing by a legal monopoly should be removed.
Conclusion
This Note has presented an economic and legal analysis of monop-
oly pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Under this analysis, IBM's
pricing behavior in Telex v. IBM is best interpreted as limit pricing.
The Telex prohibition against limit pricing under § 2 conflicts with
economic theory, which teaches that limit pricing yields the best at-
tainable outcome in a monopoly market, and with the Supreme Court,
which has sanctioned limit pricing in its potential competition deci-
sions under § 7 of the Clayton Act. The Telex holding-that IBM's
pricing actions violated § 2 of the Sherman Act-should therefore be
reversed.
124. See Credit Bureau Reports v. Retail Credit Co., 476 F.2d 989, 992-93 (5th Cir.
1973) (potential entrant entitled to injunction against exclusionary conduct by monopoly
firm).
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